Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Brokerage Fees by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 4 
January 1939 
Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Brokerage Fees 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Brokerage Fees, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 607 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/21 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
is immoderate and unreasonable.s This was thought, on the basis of Dix v.
Martin, to be the Missouri rule.'4 Indiana formerly held 5 that, where the
injuries were inflicted malo animo and the acts were abhorrent to the
family relation, an action would lie. It has repudiated this view.16 In
Wells v. Wells,17 the same court that decided Dix V. Martin and the instant
case allowed a parent to recover against a minor child declaring the public
policy of the state to be settled by Dix v. Martin. The instant case appears
inconsistent with that decision.
Legal writers have expressed the opinion that the broad general rule
should be limited in its application to instances in which the reasons on
which it is based apply. It has been suggested that the parent be granted
a qualified privilege in respect to parental discipline and control and to the
conduct of the domestic establishment.'s He would be liable, not for mere
errors of judgment, but for injuries caused by acts manifestly outside the
parental relation or in excess of his authority. Thus the child would be
allowed to recover damages where it is admitted, by the criminal law at
least, that he was wronged.
W. B. W.
TRADE REGULATION-ROBINSoN-PATMAN AcT-BROMERAGE FuEs--[Fed-
eral].-A purchasing agency furnished marketing information and other
purchasing services to over 300 subscribing wholesalers for a monthly
stipend. The agency also made purchases for its subscribers at their request,
passing on to them the brokerage commissions collected from sellers."
Brokerage commissions thus received by 86 per cent of the subscribers
amounted to less than the amount paid by them for the services under the
contract with the purchasing agency. The facilities of the agency enabled
sellers to find buyers without employing brokers to reach these customers.
The Federal Trade Commission issued an order 2 to the subscribing buyers,
the purchasing agency, and the sellers to desist from payment or receipt
of brokerage fees in violation of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.3
13. Clasen v. Pruhs (1903) 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640, 5 Ann. Cas. 112.
14. Note (1923) 31 A. L. R. 1157, 1161.
15. Treschman v. Treschman (1901) 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961, 963.
16. Smith v. Smith (1924) 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128.
17. (1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 109.
18. Reeves, Domestic Relations (4th ed. 1888) 357; McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. R. 1030, 1079.
1. Buyers sometimes named the seller from whom they preferred to
purchase, sometimes not. Sellers shipped and billed orders directly to
buyers, and buyers paid directly to sellers, who sent commissions to the
purchasing agent.
2. (1937) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 9058.
3. "* * * it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive compensation, or any
allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in con-
nection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to
the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in be-
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On petition for review of the order, held, that, irrespective of their effect
on competition, the payments and their receipt violated this section of the
Act. Order enforced.4
The instant case is the seconds to declare that the exception "for ser-
vices rendered" in Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act has no applica-
tion to services rendered to a seller by a buyer or his agent.6 Designed to
strike at the receipt of pseudo-brokerage by powerful chain buyers 7 the
section as originally drawn flatly prohibited payment of brokerage to the
"other party" to the transaction of his agent or controlled intermediary.8
At the instance of representatives of cooperative buyers,9 the clause exempt-
ing payments "for services rendered" was added. This amendment has
spawned endless conjecture as to who may render compensable services
thereunder.10 A comparison of the wording of the section and of expres-
half, or is subject to the direct or indirect control of any party to such
transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted
or paid." (1936) 49 Stat. 1426, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. see. 13(c)
(italics supplied).
4. Oliver Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 6 U. S.
L. Week 1068.
5. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 96
F. (2d) 687, cert. denied (1938) 59 S. Ct. 101, involved almost identical
facts. See. 2(c) has given rise to especially lively controversy in proceed-
ings under it by the F. T. C., which has issued thirteen complaints of viola-
tions thereunder. The only contested proceedings under the Act have in-
volved the brokerage paragraph. Four of the five orders issued under the
paragraph have been appealed to the courts. Two cases are still pending.
(1939) 6 U. S. L. Week 1199.
6. The position taken by the Federal Trade Commission in these cases,
which was sustained by both courts, is that any services rendered to a
seller by a buyer or his agent or controlled intermediary are incidental to
the transaction of purchase and are donated to the seller. The cases them-
selves do not go so far, however, as to say that a broker may not render
services to both seller and buyer and receive compensation from both, pro-
vided the broker retains all pecuniary benefits himself. If a buyer incurs
expense in providing himself with a brokerage department or agency, the
fact that services thus furnished his sellers cannot be compensated may
result in an actual discrimination in favor of those employing brokers com-
pensated by the seller. Note (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 113-4.
7. Hamilton and Loevinger, A Second Attack on Price Discrimination
(1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 153, 178; Note (1938) 6 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 203; and see Fed. Trade Comm., Final Report on Chain
Store Investigation (1935) Sen. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 62.
8. While the section is in terms applicable to payments to a seller, etc.,
the application to such a situation will be so rare that only payments to
the buyer or his intermediary are here referred to. Presumably the same
principles are applicable to either situation.
9. 2 Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Judiciary on
H. R. No. 4995 (1936) 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 334, 338.
10. See excerpts from brief for F. T. C. in the Biddle case (1937) 105
C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 807; C. J. Swan's dissent in Biddle Purchas-
ing Co. v. F. T. C. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 687, 693; Evans, Anti-
Price-Discrimination Act of 1936 (1936) 23 Va. L. Rev. 140; Fly, The
Sugar Institute Decision and the Anti-Trust Laws: 2 (1936) 46 Yale L. J.
228, 237; Gallagher, Federal Price Fixing Laws (1937) 3 John Marshall
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sions of legislative intent" gives ample evidence that Congress was una-
ware of the import of its words. While the construction adopted by the
court in the instant case seems to render sterile the exception, the phrase
may yet be given some meaning if it is held to permit brokerage payments
to intermediaries who actually render services and retain fees thus earned.'2
Unless this construction permits buyer-employed intermediaries to collect
brokerage fees, however, the exception for services rendered is still mean-
ingless inasmuch as only independent brokers would then be within the
purview of the exception.' s There seems no justification in the wording of
the act itself, in the utterances of Congressional intent,1 or in the two
judicial interpretations of the pertinent section15 for the position that the
exception applies to buyer-controlled or -employed intermediaries and
not to buyers who render services to sellers, or who at least obviate the
necessity of independent brokers' services. There is more justification for
the construction that would bring cooperatives within the saving phrase
"for services rendered."16
L. Q. 230, 232; George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First
Year (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 404; Jaffe, Some Comments on the
Price-Discrimination Act (1936) 10 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 402, 418; Note
(1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 113; Note (1938) 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 203.
It is noteworthy that rarely do any two of the above authorities agree on
the proper interpretation of the pertinent section.
11. See e. g., (1936) H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess." 14-15;
(1936) H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 7; (1936) 80 Cong. Rec.
3114, 9418, 9420.
12. This is the construction favored by the Federal Trade Comm. (1937)
105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 807.
13. No express exception is needed to legalize payments to independent
brokers, who are nowhere dealt with in the Act. Note (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev.
316, 324. However, the House Committee viewed the section as requiring
that no fees be paid even to true brokers except for services rendered to the
payor. (1936) H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 15. This inter-
pretation would treat an exception as broadening the scope of a general
prohibition. See Note (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 1285, 1312-1315.
14. See e. g., (1936) 80 Cong. Rec. 9414.
15. Indeed, the court in the Biddle case (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d)
687, 691, stated that "if buyers' agents or intermediaries are excepted for
services rendered, so too are the buyers themselves." But see Note (1938)
6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 203.
16. Such justification, if any, is to be found, however, not in see. 2(c),
but in the appendage to the Robinson-Patman Act, sec. 4, which provides
that a cooperative may return to its members the net earnings or surplus re-
sulting from its trading operations. Inasmuch as cooperatives are not else-
where treated differently in the Act, the apparently superfluous provision
may be given content by allowing the return to members of payments
received by cooperatives for services to the adverse party in the transaction.
There is reason to believe that this construction accords with the intent of
Congress in enacting sec. 4. Conference Report and Statement of the
Mgrs. on the Part of the House (1936) 80 Cong. Rec. 9415. It should be
noted, however, that sec. 4 does not apply, in terms at least, to cooperative
wholesale or retail associations. See for discussion of this interpretation
George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act (1937) 4 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 404; Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act (1936) 22
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In the cases construing and applying Section 2(c),' it had been found
that services had been rendered by the intermediaries involved and that
the sellers had merely paid the regular brokerage fees fixed for similar
services rendered by independent brokers.17 In view of the acknowledged
purpose of the legislation to prevent secret rebates in the form of fake
brokerage allowances,' 8 a provision that condemns all payments, regardless
of their actual effect19 and of whether valuable services are rendered
therefor, except on condition that the compensation not reach the buyer
under any arrangement whatever, might well seem to be so ill-adapted to
reach the-evil sought to be remedied as to be of questionable constitution-
ality. 20 A justification suggested for the provision is that the determination
in each case of the point when a brokerage allowance exceeds the value of
the services rendered presents a serious administrative problem, particularly
in view of the intangible nature of brokerage services. 21 It is submitted,
however, that brokerage services have a relatively constant and fixed value
to any particular seller and that the issue should be one of discrimination
by the seller as between purchaser-a fact much easier of determination
than the computation of the precise value of the services. 22
A. B. A. J. 593; Note (1937) 31 IMI. L. Rev. 907; Note (1936) 36 Col. L.
Rev. 1285, 1291, 1313.
17. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. F. T. C. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d)
687, 693; Oliver Bros., Inc. v. F. T. C. (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 6 U. S. L. Week
1068. See also Wilmington Provision Co., Inc. v. Wallace (C. C. A. 3, 1934)
72 F. (2d) 989.
18. See Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-The Mean-
ing of Sections 1 and 3 (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 593; Sen. Comm. Rep. No.
1502 (1936) 105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 704.02; House Comm. Rep.
No. 2287 (1936) 105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 704.01. There can be
little question as to the power of Congress to declare such practices to be
unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce and to legislate
against them. Trunz Pork Stores, Inc. v. Wallace (C. C. A. 2, 1934) 70 F.
(2d) 689. The Commission has rejected a distinction proposed by the Great
A. & P. Tea Co. between discounts equivalent to brokerage made as part
of the price of goods and a discount in lieu of brokerage reflected by the
price of goods. It also rejected the Tea Company's contention that broker-
age might be passed on to buyers as savings in cost under the cost proviso
or the differentials proviso of the general Act. F. T. C. Docket No. 3031
(1938) 105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 9341.
19. Fair compensation for services actually rendered or savings effected
can not injure competition, if paid without discrimination as to parties en-
titled thereto. See Hamilton and Loevinger, A Second Attack on Price
Discrimination (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 153, 168;
Comment (1938) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 179.
20. See Brown, The Scope of Federal Power over Price Discrimination
(1936) 10 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 430, 450; Clothier, Legislation in Restraint of
Trade (1937) 12 Temp. L. Q. 3, 26; McLaughlin, The Courts and the
Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction (1931T) 4 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 410. Oliver Bros., Inc. v. F. T. C. (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 6
U. S. L. Week 1068, purports to find the section immune from constitutional
attack. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota (1927) 274 U. S. 1, is un-
satisfactorily distinguished by the court.
21. Comment (1938) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 179.
22. See authorities cited supra, note 16.
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The instant decision is a victory for the independent brokerage interests,
which furnished part of the pressure that brought forth the Robinson-
Patman Act.2 3 Its effect will be an adjustment of the marketing function
heretofore served by the purchasing agent.2 ' The economies in distribution
resulting from a combination of the brokerage function and that of per-
forming purchasing services are sacrificed. 25 The net result is that the
brokerage function will become an enforced responsibility of the seller.2 6
F. R. lK.
23. See George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First Year
(1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 404.
24. See McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-
Patman Act (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 334.
25. See Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assump-
tions and Expectations (1937) 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 137, 148; Note (1938)
6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 203. It may be noted that the Robinson-Patman Act
makes legal one of the objectives sought by the Sugar Institute and con-
demned in Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States (1936) 297 U. S. 553. See
especially in this connection Fly, The Sugar Institute Decision and the Anti-
Trust Laws: 2 (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 228, 237-242.
26. See Phillips, The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimination Law
and the Chain Store (1936) 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 62, 73. One position taken
in the Committee Reports is that a buyer or a buyer-controlled or -employed
intermediary cannot render legally compensable services in the nature of
brokerage to the seller. "When free of coercive influence of mass buying
power, discounts in lieu of brokerage are not accorded to buyers who deal
with the seller direct since such sales must bear instead their appropriate
share of seller's own selling cost." House Comm. Rep. No. 2287 (1936) 105
C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 704.01. Cf. Mr. Celler's remarks in (1936)
80 Cong. Rec. 9420. It has been difficult to deny, however, that there may
be a rendering of service by a purchasing agent, for instance, to sellers con-
tacted by it, or, at least, a saving of the expense of sales promotion. See
excerpts from brief for F. T. C. (1937) 105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par.
807. Any defense based on that argument is lost before the Commission,
however, if the fees collected by the purchasing agent are passed on to its
subscribing buyers, who can render no service to either the sellers or their
agent. See e. g., F. T. C. Complaint No. 3032 (1937) 106 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. par. 8758. See also supra, note 6.
An interesting line of cases in this connection is the series upholding
allowances by railroads to elevator owners for elevation of their own grain
which had been transported by the railroads involved, notwithstanding the
elevation was advantageous to the recipients of the allowances. A federal
statute prohibited payments by a carrier to a shipper in consideration of the
latter's shipping goods over the carrier's lines, but made an exception where
services were rendered by the shipper in connection with the transportation.
(1906) 34 Stat. 584, 586, 587, 590, (1927) 49 U. S. C. A. secs. 1(1-9), 6,
41, 16; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Diffenbaugh (1911) 222 U. S. 42;
Union Pac. R. R. v. Updike Grain Co. (1911) 222 U. S. 215; United States
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1913) 231 U. S. 274; and see Mitchell Coal & C.
Co. v. Pennsylvania By. (1913) 230 U. S. 247; cf. Lehigh Valley R. R. v.
United States (1917) 243 U. S. 444. Quaere: Are not brokerage payments
to a buyer, or his intermediary, commensurate with the savings effected by
the recipient's services, analogous to the allowances sustained for services
rendered by shippers?
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